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Abstract
When governments impose a quota or tariff on imports, it is well known that the resulting
rents and revenues trigger costly rent-seeking and revenue-seeking activities, which are welfare-
reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the
protectionist-induced resource misallocation. Repeated interaction among firms can eliminate
wasteful rent- and revenue-seeking expenditures through cooperation. We show that while
aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises, the conditions
under which cooperation arises differ by policy. This difference arises because a firm must incur
additional cost to physically import and distribute the goods associated with additional quota
licenses, whereas there is no such cost when it comes to consuming additional tariff revenue.
Thus, quotas and tariffs are non-equivalent. We provide a simple sufficient condition under which
cooperative elimination of rent-seeking under quotas is easier than cooperative elimination of
revenue-seeking under tariffs and therefore a quota is the preferred policy whenever the policy
admits cooperation.
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1 Introduction
First discussed extensively in the 1960s, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas has been debated ever
since. The standard interpretation of this equivalence states that if the level of imports implied
by the tariff is set as a quota, then this tariff-equivalent quota generates an implicit tariff equal
to the explicit tariff originally under consideration. The implicit tariff is the quota-induced wedge
between foreign and domestic prices. Krueger's seminal 1974 paper, however, showed that tariffs
and quotas are not necessarily equivalent because quotas create rent-seeking incentives as firms vie
for quota licenses and their associated rents. Indeed, the welfare costs of a quota could far exceed
those of a tariff as the economy finds itself inside the production possibilities frontier due to welfare
costs that go beyond the inefficiency associated with quota- or tariff-induced resource reallocation.
Subsequently, Bhagwati (1980) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) pointed out that tariffs may
induce revenue-seeking behavior that is just as wasteful as the rent-seeking induced by quotas. In
this paper, we examine whether tariffs and quotas are equivalent in a repeated game setting when
allowing cooperation that eliminates rent-seeking under a quota and revenue-seeking under a tariff.
Despite significant trade liberalization over the past 50 years, many countries still impose both
tariffs and quotas. Examples of quotas include marble in India, completely knocked-down motor
vehicle parts in Ecuador, and toys in Mexico (Trade Policy Review Body 2011; Committee on
Foreign Trade 2012; Trade Policy Review Body 2013), not to mention the wide use of tariff rate
quotas on agricultural products.1 Moreover, firms exert significant rent-seeking efforts to obtain
quota licenses and tariff revenues. Marshall (2002) and Marowits (2015) document import license
lobbying for white corn in Mexico and cheese in Canada.2 In the United States, thousands of
special interest groups lobby over federal budgetary appropriations (5219 groups in 2009, Center
for Responsive Politics 2015) and tax expenditures in particular (Drutman 2012; Rowland 2013).3
Of course, only a portion of government revenues derive from tariff revenue. But tariff revenue is
1A tariff rate quota (TRQ) is a two-part tariff wherein one tariff is applied until imports exceed a fixed amount
after which additional imports face a higher out-of-quota tariff. Often the out-of-quota tariff is prohibitive and
results in zero out-of-quota imports. In this case, a TRQ is similar to an outright quota.
2Interestingly, as discussed in Hranaiova et al. (2006), auctioning import licenses is rare despite the attention
received in the literature (see, for example, Krishna 1990, 1993a,b). Instead, government allocation in response to
import license requests by firms constitutes the most common method of quota administration (Hranaiova et al.
2003).
3Practically, firms could lobby to shift government disbursements toward infrastructure projects relevant to their
industry or for corporate tax breaks.
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nonetheless government revenue and so lobbying over government revenue is, de facto, lobbying over
tariff revenue.4 Indeed, according to Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980, pp. 1070-71), That lobbies
exist, and utilize real resources for pursuit of a share in the revenues disbursed by the state, is
so obvious from the most casual observation as to require no extended justification. Ultimately, a
policy environment featuring tariffs and quotas and their induced rent- and revenue-seeking behavior
reflects the reality of current trade policy.
We re-consider the equivalence between tariffs and quotas by allowing the possibility that re-
peated interaction may support cooperation among firms that agree, implicitly or explicitly, to
eliminate wasteful rent- and revenue-seeking under, respectively, a quota or tariff policy regime.
We allow firms to engage in rent-seeking to influence the government's allocation of import licenses
under a quota regime or in revenue-seeking over the tariff revenue collected by the government. We
assume that the imported good requires a (non-traded) distribution service to import and deliver
the good from the port of entry to the market. Practically, this represents the services provided
by importers or customs brokers who identify and build relationships with exporters in foreign
countries, arrange transport of the good, clear the good through customs, and deliver it into the
domestic distribution network. These real-world features of importing make import distribution
costly, which plays an important role in our analysis.
Our main result is a non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas. When firms sustain cooperation,
outcomes (including labor and production allocations, prices, and income) are equivalent under the
tariff and tariff-equivalent quota. However, while cooperative outcomes are identical, the conditions
determining whether cooperation occurs differ. In particular, we provide a simple sufficient condition
under which cooperation is easier to sustain under quotas and so, for a given range of the discount
factor, cooperative elimination of rent-seeking occurs under the quota policy regime but not under
the tariff policy regime. Thus, tariffs and quotas non non-equivalent.
A costly distribution effect in the presence of diminishing marginal returns drives our non-
equivalence result. The benefit of deviating from cooperation under a quota is reduced by the
continually increasing labor requirement needed to make use of each additional import license gained
by deviating. Conversely, no labor is required to enjoy the additional tariff revenue gained through
4According to the World Bank World Development Indicators, the share of government revenue accounted for by
tariff revenue was, on average, 13.3% in 2010 (23% for low-income countries).
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revenue-seeking, so that each additional unit of tariff revenue is as profitable as the initial unit.
Hence, it is not costly distribution per se that drives our results, but rather the rising marginal
cost of distribution. General equilibrium effects on prices and wages exacerbate the reduction in
distribution profits under quotas. Thus, costly import distribution makes deviation under a quota
less attractive relative to deviation under a tariff, making cooperation easier to sustain under the
quota regime relative to the tariff regime.
Given our specific factors model of trade, diminishing marginal returns to distribution activities
emerge naturally. Specifically, firms own equal shares of the fixed capital stock used for distribution,
and the fixed nature of a firm's distribution capital stock generates diminishing marginal productiv-
ity of labor. However, our result generalizes beyond this particular environment. Our distribution
service entails more than physically moving goods from port to market. The importer also pro-
vides services that rely on identifying and building relationships with exporters in foreign countries.
Thus, in practice, a firm's distribution capital stock consists of physical capital (e.g., trucks and
warehouses) and firm-specific intangible capital (e.g., relationships with exporters). While the for-
mer may be transferable between firms (perhaps in rental markets), the latter is not readily traded
between firms. Thus, difficulties associated with transferring the firm-specific intangible capital that
underlie an importer's ability to produce distribution services generate diminishing returns in more
general settings than our specific factors model.
We also consider the impact of our non-equivalence result on the government's policy choice.
Our second main result is that, in situations where cooperation prevails, a quota always maximizes
the government's payoff and, for a substantial range of discount factors, it uniquely maximizes the
government's payoff. Underlying this result is that cooperation may be sustainable only under
the quota. Moreover, this may help reconcile the discrepancy between the perceived theoretical
superiority of tariffs over quotas with the non-trivial practical usage of quotas.
The theoretical literature generally views tariffs as superior to quotas.5,6 In particular, tariffs
confer less market power and thus lower prices than quotas (see, for example, Harris 1985; Krishna
1989). 7 Tariffs are also preferred over quotas in practice. As a general rule, Article XI of the General
5Bhagwati et al. (1998, p.225) certainly hold this view by stating that [Pelcovits (1976)] shows that . . . the tariff
is not always preferable to a quota [in terms of welfare], contrary to general intuition.
6Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2011b), Chen et al. (2011a), and Hwang et al. (2011) find that quotas may be preferable
to tariffs in the sense that they deliver lower consumer prices.
7According to Blonigen et al. (2013, p.1), the market power effect is [o]ne of the most well-known examples of
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) bans quantitative restrictions and the recent elimination
of quotas under the Multi Fibre Agreement put this principle into practice. Nevertheless, while
some countries do not use quotas, quotas remain an important trade policy instrument in practice.
For example, in 2014, Brazil and the European Union each imposed quantitative restrictions on
2800 and 2500 products, respectively, nearly 600 of which were outright quotas in the European
Union and 40 in Brazil.8 Thus, our result on policy choice helps rationalize the persistent usage of
quotas rather than tariffs despite apparent theoretical evidence to the contrary and the influence of
GATT Article XI.
Our paper merges two literatures: the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, and the effect of repeated
interaction on rent-seeking expenditures. A long literature has established that equivalence breaks
down in a variety of partial equilibrium environments. Early contributions emphasized imperfect
competition (e.g., Bhagwati 1965; Shibata 1968; Rodriguez 1974; Fishelson and Flatters 1975; Itoh
and Ono 1982). Recent contributions emphasize dynamic profit-maximization (Dockner and Haug
1990), asymmetric information (Matschke 2003), demand uncertainty (Chen et al. 2011b), tariff-
rate quotas (Chen et al. 2011a), or the presence of an upstream producer (Hwang et al. 2011).9
However, none of these papers considers the impact of rent- or revenue-seeking on equivalence or
the issue of cooperation in a repeated game. Moreover, given their partial equilibrium nature, they
do not address general equilibrium welfare consequences of tariffs versus quotas.
Nor does the rent-seeking literature address these questions. The traditional rent-seeking litera-
ture has focused on rent dissipation in rent-seeking contests (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975) and, under
free entry into rent-seeking, the full dissipation of rents (Corcoran 1984; Corcoran and Karels 1985;
Higgins et al. 1985).10 We are not, of course, the first authors to show that repeated interaction
may mitigate the costs of rent-seeking through cooperation. Recent work on repeated rent-seeking
games considers how repetition affects the possibility of cooperation in regulatory contests (Shaffer
and Shogren 2008), the appropriation of government foreign aid revenue (Svensson 2000), and the
this nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas.
8Data are disaggregated at the 8-digit level and are from the non-tariff measures (NTM) records available in the
UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database, accessed via WITS (World Integrated Trade
Solution) at http://wits.worldbank.org/.
9Blonigen et al. (2013) also find empirical support for quotas conferring more market power than tariffs on market
participants.
10See Congleton et al. (2008) for a survey.
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level of rent-seeking (Shaffer and Shogren 2009).11
In contrast to these literatures, our focus is on comparing the possibilities for cooperation (and
thereby elimination of rent-seeking) in a general equilibrium environment under two different poli-
cies, tariffs and quotas, that are equivalent in a world without rent-seeking. Even if the aggregate
economic effects of two policies are identical, we show that policy details can create differences in
the possibility of eliminating rent-seeking through cooperation and, therefore, a preference for one
policy over the other.
2 Model of a rent-seeking economy
We model a small open economy consisting of three sectors: the agricultural sector (A), which is the
exportable sector and the numeraire good, the manufacturing sector (F ), which is the importable
sector and, following Krueger (1974), the distribution sector (D) that produces a non-traded service
required to import the manufactured good.12 Units of account are chosen such that international
prices of traded goods are 1 and one unit of D is needed to import one unit of F . Thus, the domestic
price of F is
pF = 1 + pD + t, (1)
where pD is the endogenous price of D and t ≥ 0 is the tariff.
2.1 Production and consumption
Each sector j = A,F,D has a fixed supply of a specific factor K¯j and nj specific factor owners who
own equal shares,
K¯j
nj
, of the factor specific to their sector. We assume that n ≡ nD = nA + nF
so that each specific factor owner in a tradeable sector also owns the specific factor required for
distribution.13 Letting Lj denote the labor hired by a representative specific factor owner in sector
11See also Leininger and Yang (1994), who analyze a dynamic version of the classic Tullock (1980) model, Pecorino
(1998), and Polborn (2006). Cheikbossian (2012) actually shows that cooperation can increase rent-seeking expendi-
ture by resolving a collective action problem.
12Distribution costs for domestically produced goods are embedded in their production functions.
13We relax this assumption in Section 5.1.
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j, specific factor owners face the constant returns to scale production functions
QA = a
(
LA,
K¯A
nA
)
QF = f
(
LF ,
K¯F
nF
)
QD = d
(
LD,
K¯D
nD
)
that display positive but diminishing marginal product of labor (fL ≡ ∂f(·)∂LF > 0 and fLL ≡
∂2f(·)
∂L2F
<
0, and similarly for a(·) and d(·)). While Qj denotes output of a representative firm in sector j,
A, F and D denote the aggregate output of all firms in a given sector. Further, we let ηj denote
the elasticity of labor demand in sector j (in absolute value) and φj,k denote the share of output
in sector(s) k paid to sector j labor (for example φF,F =
fL(LF )×LF
F denotes manufacturing labor's
share of manufacturing output and φF,FD =
fL(LF )×LF
F+D denotes manufacturing labor's share of total
F +D output).14
Thus, a specific factor owner in sector j faces the following maximization problem:
max
Lj ,LD
pj ×Qj(Lj) + pD ×QD(LD)− w × (Lj + LD) .
Taking the wage w as given (see Section 2.3 for equilibrium determination of w), profit-maximizing
factor owners hire labor up to the point where
aL (LA) = w, (2)
fL(LF )× pF = w, and (3)
dL(LD)× pD ≥ w. (4)
Given that one unit of the distribution good is required to bring a unit of imports from port to
market, aggregate output of the distribution good, D, must equal imports, M , in equilibrium. The
inequality in (4) is one implication of this. By constraining imports and hence distribution output,
a quota implies that (4) holds with a generally strict inequality.
When analyzing the differing prospects for cooperation under the tariff and quota regimes in
14In equilibrium, φj,k and ηj are invariant across specific factor owners within sector j.
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later sections, we distinguish between normal rents, Π, and excess rents, pi, of specific factor
owners (equivalently, firms) in their distribution sector activities (or, analogously, the agriculture or
manufacturing sectors). Letting W denote the total wage bill, the left-hand side of Figure 1 depicts
these concepts for an individual firm with respect to labor hired in the distribution sector under
quotas. A firm maximizes profits under free trade or a tariff regime by hiring labor until the wage
equals the marginal revenue product, w = pD × dL (LD). However, a firm is constrained under a
binding quota and hires only the labor required to distribute its quota allocation (denoted L¯D in
Figure 1), which yields w < pD × dL(L¯D). The difference pD × dL(L¯D) − w represents the excess
rent on each unit of labor hired. Under tariffs or free trade, this difference vanishes and leaves a
firm's share of any tariff revenue as its excess rent associated with the distribution of imports.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The right-hand side of Figure 1 illustrates these concepts with respect to firm-level output
decisions. The upward sloping curve depicts the labor cost incurred to produce each marginal unit
of output. The price of distribution services is decomposed into two parts. One part, ρ, compensates
the firm for labor costs incurred in producing the marginal unit of output. A second part
τD ≡ pD − w
dL (LD(QD))
= pD − ρD (5)
represents the excess rent on the marginal unit of output. Again, if the firm is unconstrained in
its labor hiring decisions, as under tariffs or free trade, it hires until ρD = pD (labor cost of the
marginal unit equals price of the marginal unit) and the excess rent on the marginal unit of output,
τD, vanishes. But, when the amount of labor required in distribution is constrained by a quota,
ρD < pD and τD > 0. It is useful to note here that, by construction, the quota-equivalent tariff
equals the value of τD under the quota in the absence of rent-seeking.
15 In this case, a firm's excess
distribution rent is piD = t×QD = τD ×QD under the tariff and quota regimes, respectively.
For the consumption side of the economy, we assume a representative consumer with demand
for the manufactured good given by
CF = C(pF , Y ), (6)
15A firm would choose to produce its quota level of distribution output under the tariff regime if the price it
receives under the tariff regime is pD − t where t = τD . As such, the labor demands of all firms in all sectors would
be unchanged across the tariff and quota regimes, as would all endogenous variables in the model.
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where Y is aggregate income. Letting CA denote consumption of A, we also assume homothetic
preferences, which imply that the consumption ratio CFCA is decreasing in the relative price pF ,
∂(CF /CA)
∂pF
< 0, but independent of income.16 Finally, aggregate income is
Y = A+ pF × F + pD ×D + t×M. (7)
Each worker earns income w and each specific factor owner earns firm profits (revenues net of wages
paid to workers) plus any share of tariff revenue under the tariff.
2.2 Quotas, tariffs, rent- and revenue-seeking
Absent rent- and revenue-seeking, import licenses and tariff revenue are distributed equally among
specific factor owners. Thus, for a tariff t and import level M , tariff revenue is t ×M and each
specific factor owner receives t×Mn . Analogously, the restricted level of imports under the (binding)
quota is M¯ with each specific factor owner allocated M¯n licenses, which endows the right to import
and sell this amount of F .17 Our interest revolves around the case where, in the absence of rent-
and revenue-seeking, the quota and tariff are equivalent so that the quantity of imports under the
tariff is the same as under the quota.18
When rent- or revenue-seeking takes place, LR denotes the level of rent-seeking labor hired by a
representative firm (rent-seeking expenditures are thus LR×w) and R denotes the aggregate level of
rent- or revenue-seeking by all firms. All specific factor owners can engage in both revenue-seeking
under the tariff and, given the allocation of the specific factor in the distribution sector, rent-seeking
under the quota.19 In this case, a contest success function determines a firm's allocation of tariff
revenue, LRR × t×M , and quota licenses, LRR × M¯ given its level of rent-seeking LR.
Under tariffs, a representative rent-seeking firm in sector j faces the following optimization
16Recall that pA = 1.
17We assume that the quota remains binding throughout the paper. Moreover, we assume that a given trade
policy is time-invariant; Brainard and Verdier (1997) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model this persistence.
18We abstract from other sources of revenue and assume that tariffs are the only source of government revenues over
which firms lobby. We do this in order to directly compare rent-/revenue-seeking and the potential for cooperation
under the tariff and quota regimes.
19As in Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that workers do not engage in
rent-seeking.
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problem:
max
LR,Lj ,LD
pj ×Qj(Lj) + pD ×QD(LD) + LR
R
× t×M − w × (Lj + LD + LR) .
The first-order conditions with respect to Lj and LD produce equations (2)-(4). Assuming a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium, the first order condition with respect to rent-seeking LR yields
LR =
n− 1
n2
× 1
w
× V, (8)
where n = nA + nF and V = t ×M represents the tariff revenue or, more generally, the rents
being sought under the tariff.20
Under quotas, a representative rent-seeking firm faces the following optimization problem:
max
LR,Lj ,LD
pj ×Qj(Lj) + pD ×Q∗D − w × (Lj + LD + LR)
s.t. Q∗D = min
{
LR
R
M¯, d
(
LD,
K¯D
n
)}
.
The constraint conveys that a firm can only import and distribute goods for which it has a license
and must produce the distribution service to do so. Clearly, to avoid hiring unused labor or gaining
unused quota licenses, a firm's distribution output equals its quota allocation: Q∗D = QD =
LR
R M¯ .
Denoting the amount of labor required to produce this level of distribution output by LD
(
LR
R M¯
)
,
the specific factor owner's optimization problem can be rewritten as:
max
Lj ,LR
pj ×Qj(Lj) + pD × LR
R
M¯ − w ×
(
Lj + LD
(
LR
R
M¯
)
+ LR
)
.
The first-order condition for Lj produces (2)-(3). The first-order condition for LR, again imposing
a symmetric Nash equilibrium, yields the Nash equilibrium level of rent-seeking
LR =
n− 1
n2
× 1
w
× V, (9)
20Section 5.2 discusses the situation wherein less than the full amount of tariff revenue is available for allocation
and thus subject to revenue-seeking.
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where V ≡ τD × M¯ represents the total excess rents under the quota regime.21
Thus, equations (8) and (9) give the same general expression for firm-level rent-seeking, LR,
regardless of whether rents are tariff revenues or quota rents. Naturally, LR is proportional to
available rents and decreasing in the cost of hiring labor, w, to undertake such activities. Further, a
larger group competing for rents increases aggregate rent-seeking (n×LR) but reduces rent-seeking
by an individual specific factor owner (LR).
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the economy is defined by equilibrium in the markets for the consumption goods and
the distribution service, equilibrium in the labor market, and balanced trade. In all three sectors,
consumption must equal production net of trade:
CA = A−X (10)
CF = F +M (11)
M = D. (12)
Letting Lj denote aggregate labor use by all firms in sector j ∈ {A,D,F}, labor market equilibrium
is characterized by full employment and wage equality resulting from labor mobility:
L¯ = LA + LF + LD +R (13)
w = aL(LA) = fL(LF )× pF ≤ dL(LD)× pD, (14)
with the last inequality taking the form of a strict equality under tariffs and a (generally) strict
inequality under quotas. Finally,
M = X (15)
is the balanced trade condition.
Under free trade (i.e., no binding quota and t = 0), the full employment condition (13) and the
inverted versions of the first-order conditions (14) yield an optimal labor demand for each sector,
21See Appendix for a derivation of (9).
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L∗j (pj), that depends only on pj . Using (1) and (6) together with (11)-(12) yields
c (1 + pD, Y ) = F +D, (16)
representing goods market equilibrium. Substituting (7) and the optimal labor demands into (16)
yields
c (1 + pD, nA ×QA(L∗A (pD)) + (1 + pD)× nF ×QF (L∗F (pD)) + pD × n×QD(L∗D (pD)))
= nF ×QF (L∗F (pD)) + n×QD(L∗D (pD)), (17)
which depends only on the single endogenous variable pD. The equilibrium value of pD then allows
solving for all other endogenous variables. Departing from the assumption of free trade introduces
only minor modifications to the solution procedure.
2.4 Economy's output reallocation response when L¯ falls
For later sections, it is useful to relate the technological parameters φj,k and ηj to the economy's
output reallocation response in situations when the labor supply effectively falls. We consider two
scenarios.
First, suppose that rent-seeking does not occur but employment in the distribution sector rises
exogenously so that the effective labor supply available for producing A and F falls. A standard
result of the specific factors model is that the output reallocation response is given by dF/FdA/A =
φF,F ηF
φA,AηA
.
That is, relative output FA rises if and only if
dF/F
dA/A < 1, which holds if and only if φA,AηA > φF,F ηF .
We assume φA,AηA > φF,F ηF throughout.
22 Intuitively, when the labor share of output is higher in
agriculture than manufacturing then, all else equal, the labor-intensive agricultural sector contracts
proportionately more than the manufacturing sector when available labor falls. This intuition
remains valid unless the elasticity of labor demand is sufficiently biased toward the manufacturing
sector.23
22If the economy happens to import A and export F , then the condition φA,AηA > φF,F ηF becomes φF,F ηF >
φA,AηA. See section 3.2.2, footnote 26.
23Note that the elasticity of labor demand is the inverse elasticity of the marginal product of labor, so ηF sufficiently
larger than ηA says that the marginal revenue product curve for the F sector is sufficiently flatter than for the A
sector. Moreover, Cobb-Douglas technology implies ηA = ηF = 1 and so φA,AηA > φF,F ηF holds if and only if
φA,A > φF,F , where the labor share of output is the exponent on labor in the production function.
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Second, suppose that aggregate rent- or revenue-seeking labor exogenously rises. The effective
labor supply available for producing A, F , andD therefore shrinks. The output reallocation response
can be represented as d(F+D)/(F+D)dA/A with total relative supply of the manufactured good,
F+D
A ,
rising if and only if d(F+D)/(F+D)dA/A < 1. Similarly to the expression in the previous paragraph,
d(F+D)/(F+D)
dA/A < 1 reduces to φA,AηA > φF,FDηF under the quota or φA,AηA > φF,FDηF +φD,FDηD
under the tariff. (These expressions differ because, unlike under the binding quota, distribution
output can vary under the tariff.) We assume φA,AηA > φF,FDηF + φD,FDηD throughout.
24 The
intuition is similar to that above: when the labor share of agricultural output is higher than that of
total output associated with the imported good (i.e., inclusive of manufacturing and distribution)
then, all else equal, the labor-intensive agricultural export sector contracts proportionately more
than the importable sector.
3 Cooperation in the infinitely repeated rent-seeking game
We now investigate the equivalence of tariffs and quotas using an infinitely repeated rent-seeking
game; hereafter, we use rent-seeking generically to cover both rent-seeking under the quota and
revenue-seeking under the tariff.
The game proceeds as follows:
• Period 0: government chooses policy instrument (tariff or quota), level of instrument, and
informs firms of tariff revenue or quota allocation rules.
• Stage 1 of periods 1, 2, . . .: each specific factor owner in sector j = A,F chooses labor hired
for rent-seeking LR ≥ 0, distribution LD ≥ 0, and production Lj ≥ 0.
• Stage 2 of periods 1, 2, . . .: quotas are allocated, goods are produced, imported, distributed,
and consumed, and any tariff revenue is disbursed.
Throughout Section 3, we take the policy instrument (i.e., tariff or quota) and its level chosen by
the government in period 0 as exogenous (we investigate the government's policy choice in Section
4). Given the associated equilibrium of the economy in stage 2 of each period, we solve for the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game that begins in period 1. Our interest
24The assumption φA,AηA > φF,F ηF made above implies φA,AηA > φF,FDηF because φF,F > φF,FD.
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lies in analyzing how the sustainability of cooperation, where cooperation means zero aggregate
rent-seeking (R = 0), depends on the government's choice of policy instrument in period 0. Given
our interest in whether tariffs and quotas are equivalent, we assume the tariff and quota chosen by
the government in period 0 generate identical import levels in the absence of rent-seeking.
3.1 Constraints on cooperation under tariffs versus quotas
Given policy regime r, i.e., a tariff or quota regime, let vr,θj denote the payoff for a representative
firm in sector j when the outcome of the stage game is θ ∈ {d, c,N} , where d, c, and N denote
respectively that the representative firm deviates from the cooperative outcome, all firms cooperate,
or all firms choose the Nash equilibrium level of rent-seeking. We use similar notation hereafter
but omit irrelevant superscripts where possible without confusion. Letting δ denote the (common)
discount factor for firms, cooperation can be sustained under policy regime r via grim trigger
strategies when δ ≥ max{δ¯rF , δ¯rA} ≡ δ¯r, where
δ¯rj ≡
vr,dj − vr,cj(
vr,dj − vr,cj
)
+
(
vr,cj − vr,Nj
) . (18)
That is, eliminating rent-seeking through cooperation is possible when δ exceeds each firm's thresh-
old value δ¯rj . The constraint on cooperation, δ¯
r
j , is slacker (tighter) when the punishment threat for
cheating, vr,cj − vr,Nj , is larger (smaller) relative to the one-shot deviation incentive, vr,dj − vr,cj .
Ultimately, we are interested in ranking the critical discount factors necessary to sustain cooper-
ation under the different policy regimes. Since the binding constraint for each sector is max
{
δ¯qj , δ¯
t
j
}
,
we compare the sector-specific constraints across policy regimes by analyzing how the one-shot de-
viation incentive (Section 3.2) and the punishment threat (Section 3.3) for each sector vary between
the tariff and quota regimes.
3.2 One-shot deviation incentive
As noted above, the one-shot deviation incentive under policy regime r for a representative firm in
sector j is vr,dj − vr,cj . To compare the one-shot deviation incentive across tariffs and quotas, we first
establish the equivalence of tariffs and quotas under cooperation. This is useful because it means
that the difference in one-shot deviation incentives across policy regimes only depends on differences
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in deviation payoffs across policy regimes.
3.2.1 Cooperation payoff
The equivalence of tariff and quota outcomes under cooperation follows easily given that the quota
is the tariff-equivalent quota. That is, under cooperation, the level of imports is identical under the
quota and tariff.
The difference between the cooperative payoffs across the two policies for a representative firm
in sector j is
vtj − vqj =
[
ptjQ
t
j + p
t
DQ
t
D − wt
(
Ltj + L
t
D
)
+
tM¯
n
]
−
[
pqjQ
q
j + p
q
DQ
q
D − wq
(
Lqj + L
q
D
)]
. (19)
Absent rent-seeking, firm-level demand for distribution and production labor is identical across poli-
cies because imports are identical across policies. In turn, wages, final-good prices, labor allocations,
and production are also identical across policies. Recalling that ρq,cD + τ
q,c
D = p
q,c
D = p
t,c
D + t and
pt,cD =
w
dL(LD)
≡ ρq,cD , we have t = τ q,cD and hence
vt,cj − vq,cj =
tM¯
n
− τ q,cD
M¯
n
= 0. (20)
Thus, firm-level cooperative payoffs do not depend on the policy regime, and differences in one-shot
deviation incentives are driven entirely by differences in the deviation payoff across policy regimes.
3.2.2 Deviation payoff
The deviation payoff for a representative firm in sector j under the tariff regime relative to the
quota regime is
vtj − vqj =
[
ptjQ
t
j + p
t
DQ
t
D − wt
(
Ltj + L
t
D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πtj+Π
t
D
+ tM¯︸︷︷︸
pitD
(21)
−
[
pqjQ
q
j + p
q
DQ
q
D − wq
(
Lqj + L
q
D
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πqj+Π
q
D+pi
q
D
.
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We will show that the deviation payoff is higher under the tariff regime, vtj − vqj > 0, because,
unlike additional tariff revenue, additional import licenses under the quota entail the costly use of
resources to distribute the additional imports.
Under the tariff regime, cooperating firms refrain from rent-seeking and tariff revenues are split
evenly among firms. Given that other firms abstain from rent-seeking, a deviating firm captures the
entire tariff revenue by hiring an arbitrarily small amount of rent-seeking labor. As the amount of
rent-seeking labor is arbitrarily small, all other outcomes are (essentially) identical under deviation
and cooperation with tariffs. That is, under the tariff regime, sector output levels as well as prices
and wages are identical whether all firms cooperate or a single firm deviates.
A firm deviating from cooperation under the quota regime similarly gains all import licenses by
hiring an arbitrarily small amount of rent-seeking labor. However, unlike under the tariff regime, the
deviating firm must also hire additional labor to distribute the additional licenses. Moreover, because
the deviating firm has a fixed amount of firm-specific distribution capital and the distribution
production function exhibits diminishing marginal productivity of labor, the total amount of labor
used for distribution increases when one firm deviates and distributes the entire quota: Lq,dD >
n× Lq,cD . Moreover, the increase in aggregate labor used in the distribution sector triggers general
equilibrium effects that exacerbate the additional labor cost. Thus, deviation under the quota has
two effects on the deviating firm's payoff: the direct impact of hiring extra labor for distribution,
and the indirect impact via general equilibrium effects.
To show this formally using equation (21), we first abstract from the general equilibrium effects
of deviation under the quota (i.e., we set pq,dF = p
q,c
F and w
q,d = wq,c). As explained below,
incorporating general equilibrium effects merely implies that expression (22) is a lower bound.
Given pq,dF = p
q,c
F and w
q,d = wq,c, the difference in deviation profits across regimes in (21) due to
agriculture and manufacturing profits is Πt,dj −Πq,dj = 0. Hence, the right hand side of (21) reduces to
the difference between total distribution rents under the two regimes
(
Πt,dD + pi
t,d
D
)
−
(
Πq,dD + pi
q,d
D
)
.
This difference is (see Appendix for step-by-step derivation)
(
Πt,dD + pi
t,d
D
)
−
(
Πq,dD + pi
q,d
D
)
=
∫ M¯
M¯
n
wq,c
dL (LD (QD))
dQD − ρq,cD
[
M¯ − M¯
n
]
> 0. (22)
Figure 2 illustrates (22), showing normal rents, Π, excess rents, pi, and the wage bill, W , in the
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distribution sector under the tariff and quota regimes for the deviating firm. Mathematically, the
right hand side of (22) corresponds to area W3 in Figure 2(b).
25 This can be understood geomet-
rically. Recalling the discussion of Figure 1 in Section 2.1, Figure 2(a) shows that a deviating firm
under the tariff produces distribution output M¯n , yielding normal distribution profits Π1. Addition-
ally, the firm receives the entire tariff revenue tM¯ , areas pi1 +pi2. Figure 2(b) shows that a deviating
firm under the quota produces distribution output M¯ , yielding normal profits Π1 + Π2 and excess
rents pi1. Thus, the additional distribution rents earned by a deviating firm under the tariff relative
to the quota are given by area pi2 in Figure 2(a) which is equal to area W3 in Figure 2(b).
Area W3 has a simple economic intuition: it is a manifestation of costly distribution. When
expanding distribution output from M¯n to M¯ by deviating under the quota, additional labor is re-
quired to distribute the imports associated with the additional quota licenses. In contrast, deviating
under the tariff does not require additional labor for consuming the additional tariff revenue. W3
represents the additional labor cost required to distribute the additional licenses relative to the labor
cost incurred if either (i) the firm could expand output at a constant marginal product of labor or,
equivalently, (ii) aggregate distribution output M¯ was shared equally by all n firms. In other words,
area W3 would vanish if the marginal product of labor were constant and the
wq,c
dL(LD)
curve were
horizontal. Thus, it is not costly distribution per se that creates W3 but rather the rising marginal
cost of distribution stemming from diminishing marginal product of labor.
[Figure 2 about here.]
General equilibrium effects on wq,d and pq,dD reinforce the result that deviating from cooperation
under the quota erodes distribution rents. First, the effect on pq,dD depends on the economy's output
allocation response across A and F once distribution absorbs more of the economy's labor supply.
If relative output F+DA increases, the relative supply curve (i.e., total supply of the manufactured
good relative to the agricultural good) shifts and reduces pq,dD . This happens under our assumption
that φA,AηA > φF,F ηF (see Section 2.4). Since labor's share of output is higher in A than F then,
as long as the elasticity of labor demand is not too biased towards F , the labor-intensive A sector
contracts proportionately more than the F sector when more labor is allocated to the D sector.26
25Specifically, the integral term in (22) is equal to areas W2 +W3 while the second term on the right hand side of
(22) is area W2.
26More generally, the sufficient condition is φX,XηX > φM,MηM , where M denotes the importable good and X
denotes the exportable.
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Second, wq,d must rise to facilitate the associated labor reallocation from the A to the F sector.27
Figure 2(b) shows geometrically that the general equilibrium effects pq,dD < p
q,c
D and w
q,d > wq,c
further decrease the benefit of deviation under quotas. A lower pqD reduces excess distribution rents
pi1, and a higher w
q reduces both excess distribution rents pi1 and normal distribution rents Π1 +Π2.
Thus, general equilibrium effects exacerbate the costly distribution effect.28
Of course, the result that the deviation payoff is greater under the tariff rests on the sufficient
condition that φA,AηA > φF,F ηF which ensures that the price of distribution services falls upon
deviation under the quota regime. The necessary condition is naturally weaker and requires only
that any increase in the distribution price cannot offset the higher wage bill stemming from the
costly distribution effect. Lemma 1 summarizes the comparison of one-shot deviation incentives.
Lemma 1. If the marginal product of labor is diminishing and φA,AηA > φF,F ηF , then the one-shot
deviation incentive, vr,dj − vr,cj , is greater under the tariff regime than the quota regime.
Ultimately, deviation is less attractive under the quota because enjoying the fruits of deviation
under the quota regime, i.e., quota licenses, entails costly distribution whereas enjoying the fruits
of deviation under the tariff regime, i.e., tariff revenue, does not.
3.3 Punishment threat
Having addressed one-shot deviation incentives, we now provide a sufficient condition ensuring that
the rent-seeking payoff is greater, and thus the punishment threat weaker, under tariffs than quotas.
The difference in rent-seeking payoffs for a firm in sector j is
vtj − vqj =
[
ptjQ
t
j + p
t
DQ
t
D − wt
(
Ltj + L
t
D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πtj+Π
t
D
+ tM︸︷︷︸
pitD
− wtLtR (23)
−
[
pqjQ
q
j + p
q
DQ
q
D − wq
(
Lqj + L
q
D
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πqj+Π
q
D+pi
q
D
− wqLqR.
27A fall in the wage results in a contradiction. A falling wage implies that LA rises. With the increased labor in
distribution (since the entire binding quota is now supplied by a single firm subject to diminishing marginal returns),
LF must fall. But, given the binding quota, this implies a decrease in the consumption ratio
CF
CA
, which can only
happen if pqD rises. The rising p
q
D contradicts the initial starting point that p
q
D falls. Thus, φA,AηA > φF,F ηLF is
not only a sufficient condition for the distribution price to fall upon deviation but also for the wage to rise upon
deviation.
28Moreover, the envelope theorem implies that (i) the higher wage reduces normal agricultural rents and (ii) the
higher wage and lower pF reduce normal manufacturing rents.
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Equation (23) comprises four elements: normal rents from producing good j, normal distribution
rents, excess distribution rents, and rent-seeking expenditures.
While rent-seeking outcomes and therefore punishment threats generally differ across regimes,
we focus on the case where the punishment threat is positive under either regime: vr,cj > v
r,N
j .
29 By
reducing the labor supply available for productive purposes, our assumptions on the technological
parameters ηj and φj,k imply that rent-seeking should reduce the price of the manufactured output,
pNF < p
c
F , and therefore distribution services, p
N
D < p
c
D. Furthermore, part of the rent-seeking labor
comes from the agricultural sector which raises wages: wN > wc.30 The higher wage and lower
prices have three implications. First, normal rents fall in all sectors. Second, excess distribution
rents fall under the quota (see (5)). Third, distribution services fall under the tariff (see equation
(4)), which lowers imports and hence tariff revenue.31 These three implications on top of the rent-
seeking expenditures themselves imply that the rent-seeking payoff under either policy is lower than
the cooperative payoff. That is, the punishment threat vcj − vNj is positive.
It is more difficult to make general statements about the relation between the rent-seeking payoffs
under the tariff and quota regimes. Given the generality of our trade model, this stems from the
inherent difficulty in comparing the level of rent-seeking under the two regimes. Thus, we provide a
sufficient condition ensuring that the punishment threat is weaker under tariffs than quotas and, by
way of example, use broad economic intuition to argue that the sufficient condition is reasonable.
As a starting point, we address the specific case when the rent-seeking level of imports under
tariffs equals that under the quota.32
Lemma 2. If M t,N = M¯ , then the rent-seeking payoffs under the tariff policy equal those under the
quota policy, i.e., vt,Nj = v
q,N
j .
As argued above, rent-seeking causes imports under the tariff to fall below M¯ . That is, M t,N < M¯
in equilibrium. Nevertheless, as long as payoffs are continuous in M t,N , Lemma 2 implies that
29Given that our technological assumptions only imply (F+D
A
)N > (F+D
A
)c, it is possible under tariffs that(
CF
CA
)N
= (F+D
A−X )
N <
(
CF
CA
)c
= (F+D
A−X )
c and, via homothetic preferences, pNF > p
c
F . However, this cannot hap-
pen under quotas because D = M¯ = X. Thus, a negative punishment threat can arise under tariffs but not quotas.
Neverthless, in this case, we immediately have that the punishment threat is weaker under tariffs than quotas as
desired.
30See Appendix for a proof.
31Note that wt,N > wt,c and pt,ND < p
t,c
D together with (4) imply L
t,N
D < L
t,c
D and hence M
t,N < M¯ . In contrast,
imports under the quota with rent-seeking remain M¯ .
32See Appendix for proof.
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rent-seeking payoffs, and hence punishment threats, are similar under the tariff and quota regimes
when M t,N is not too far below M¯ .
Lemma 3 formalizes this idea in the form a sufficient condition.
Lemma 3. There exists a non-empty interval [M, M¯ ] such thatM t,N ∈ [M, M¯ ] implies vt,Nj ≥ vq,Nj .
That is, the punishment threat is weaker under tariffs than quotas when the Nash level of imports
under the tariff lie in a well specified interval around M¯ , with non-emptiness of the interval following
directly from Lemma 2.33
Not only is the interval [M, M¯ ] non-empty, but it reasonably consists of more than the singleton
point M¯ . The broad economic intuition has three parts, each revolving around M t,N < M¯ . First,
when rent-seeking shrinks the size of the productive economy, the bigger distribution sector under the
quota means that, all else equal, more labor is withdrawn from the agricultural sector, which keeps
the wage higher under the quota. Second, the quantitative nature of the quota should keep relative
output of the manufacturing sector, F+DA , higher under the quota and thus, through homothetic
preferences, push the importable price lower under the quota.34 However, M¯ > M t,N also implies
that excess rents are collected on a larger quantity under the quota. This tension between the
price and wage effects on the one hand and the quantity effect on the other aligns with the idea
behind Lemma 3: when M t,N is close enough to M¯ , any extra rents earned on a greater quantity of
distribution services under the quota cannot outweigh the higher wage and lower importable price
under the quota.
To illustrate this intuition geometrically, suppose the levels of rent-seeking labor are identical
under tariffs and quotas. We can now directly compare the four elements of rent-seeking payoffs:
rent-seeking expenditures, normal production rents, normal distribution rents, and excess distribu-
tion rents. Identical levels of rent-seeking labor and the higher quota wage imply that rent-seeking
expenditures are higher under the quota. The higher wage and lower importable price under quotas
also imply that agricultural and manufacturing normal rents are lower under quotas. This leaves a
comparison of total distribution rents under each policy:
(
Πt,ND + pi
t,N
D
)
−
(
Πq,ND + pi
q,N
D
)
.
Figure 3 illustrates the comparison and the tension between the lower price and higher wage
under the quota, on the one hand, and the higher quantity of distribution output on the other.
33Lemma 2 says that M t,N = M¯ implies vt,Nj = v
q,N
j .
34Again, the possibility of rent-seeking raising pF under tariffs only strengthens this effect.
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Areas B represent efficiency savings under the tariff resulting from a lower wage. Area E represents
the additional excess distribution rents enjoyed under the tariff due to the higher price. Areas C
are the rents earned on additional units under the quota because M¯ > M t,N .35 Figure 3 makes
clear that the rent-seeking payoff is higher under the tariff than the quota whenever areas B and
E outweigh areas C. This happens as long as imports under the tariff do not fall too far below
M¯ (i.e., areas C are relatively small). That is, there is some interval
[
M, M¯
]
where rent-seeking
distribution rents, and hence the rent-seeking payoff, are higher under tariffs than quotas as long
as M t,N lies in this interval.
[Figure 3 about here.]
It is important to emphasize that the condition M t,N ∈ [M, M¯] in Lemma 3 is a sufficient
condition for rent-seeking to be no less attractive under the tariff relative to the quota. Thus, even
if the rent-seeking equilibrium level of imports M t,N lies outside the interval (perhaps because the
interval collapses to the singleton point M¯), the rent-seeking payoff may still be higher under tariffs
than quotas and, hence, the punishment threat may still be weaker under tariffs. Moreover, even
if the punishment threat is stronger under tariffs, our main result (Proposition 1 in the following
section) still holds as long as the difference in punishment threats across policy regimes is sufficiently
small. Nevertheless, the analysis above reasonably argues that the interval
[
M, M¯
]
is non-singleton
and thus the punishment threat can easily be weaker under tariffs than quotas.
3.4 Non-equivalence
We now formally state our main result. This is based on Lemmas 1 and 3 which, respectively,
establish conditions where the one-shot deviation incentive is stronger and the punishment threat
weaker under tariffs than quotas.
Proposition 1. If the following three conditions hold (see Lemmas 1 and 3), then cooperation is
easier to sustain under the quota regime than the tariff regime, i.e., δ¯q < δ¯t: (i) technology in the
distribution sector is subject to diminishing marginal product of labor, (ii) φA,AηA > φF,F ηF , and
(iii) M t,N ∈ [M, M¯ ].
35Areas A represent rents under either policy regime.
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By construction, the quota is a tariff-equivalent quota absent any rent-seeking. Thus, conditional
on cooperation, aggregate and individual outcomes are identical across policies and, in this sense, the
policies are equivalent. However, non-equivalence emerges because, while equilibrium outcomes are
equivalent conditional on cooperation, the conditions under which cooperation is sustainable differ.
Specifically, when the sufficient conditions in Proposition 1 hold and δ ∈ (δ¯q, δ¯t), cooperation is
sustained only under the quota.36 Even though outcomes under each policy would be equivalent if
cooperation were sustained, outcomes actually differ because cooperation is sustainable only under
the quota regime.
4 Government's choice of policy regime
In Section 3, we investigated the equivalence of tariffs and quotas in an environment where firms
could cooperate to eliminate wasteful rent-seeking. To highlight the possibility of cooperation
under tariffs versus quotas, it was important that the two policies were equivalent in the absence
of rent-seeking. Thus, we treated the tariff and quota levels chosen by the government in period
0 as exogenous but, more importantly, we fixed the tariff level equal to the quota-equivalent tariff
corresponding to the exogenous quota level. We now investigate the government's policy choice in
period 0 regarding both the policy instrument itself and its level.
We first adopt the Grossman and Helpman (1994, hereafter GH) menu-auction framework and
then describe how our results generalize beyond this context. In period 0, the government chooses
the policy instrument, a tariff or quota, and its level. To this end, µ denotes the policy so that
µ ≡ M¯ ∈ [0,MFT ] under the quota and µ ≡ t ∈ [0, tpro] under the tariff where tpro is the prohibitive
tariff that results in zero imports. Firms can influence the government's policy choice via lobbying.
Lobbying takes the form of a contribution schedule. A sector's contributions to the government
depend on the policy µ implemented by the government, with Rj (µ) denoting contributions by
sector j = A,F .37,38 Notice that, unlike earlier sections where rent-seeking uses real resources (i.e.,
36Our definition of cooperation, i.e., R = 0, implies full cooperation. There could be many other subgame perfect
Nash equilibria where firms sustain partial cooperation with positive levels of rent-seeking that fall below the Nash
level. Nevertheless, the insight in Proposition 1 still holds when, for a given discount factor, full cooperation is
sustainable under the quota but only partial cooperation is sustainable under the tariff.
37One interpretation is that these contributions provide funds for short-term electoral contests.
38GH assume contributions are undertaken at the sector level, which essentially assumes away any coordination
problem among firms within a sector. Our subsequent analysis does not rely on sector level contributions. We could
alternatively model firm level contributions and, in what follows, replace Rj (µ) and vj (µ) for j = A,F with firm-level
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labor) to influence rent allocation, lobbying (via contributions) is merely a transfer between firms
and the government.39 The policy chosen by the government in period 0 takes effect in period 1
and induces a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium as described in previous sections.
Following GH, we assume that some sectors are organized and give contributions.40 Specifically,
an organized sector j contributes according to Rj (µ) = Vj (µ) − Bj , where Bj is a sector-specific
constant that GH refer to as the payoff anchor and Vj (µ) is the payoff in sector j given the policy
µ. In our model, Vj (µ) = nj
δ
1−δv
c
j (µ) if δ ≥ δ¯ (µ) but Vj (µ) = nj δ1−δvNj (µ) if δ < δ¯ (µ).41
Also following GH, we assume the government's payoff is G (µ) =
∑
j∈O Rj (µ) + aW (µ) where
O is the set of organized sectors, W (µ) is national welfare resulting from the policy (i.e., the sum
of individual consumer utilities) and a ≥ 0 is the weight placed by the government on national
welfare relative to contributions. In our model, W (µ) =
∑∞
s=1 Γsωs (µ) where ωs (µ) is the one
period national welfare from policy µ and Γs represents how much the government discounts period
s national welfare. This formulation allows us to depart from the standard treatment where Γs ≡ βs
with β denoting the government's time-invariant one period discount factor. For example, Γs 6= βs
may reflect that term limits restrict government concern over distant outcomes.42
GH show that a policy maximizing the government's payoff G (µ) is given by
µ∗ = arg max
∑
j∈O
Vj (µ) + aW (µ) . (24)
In our model, the government chooses both the trade policy instrument and its level. A policy µ∗
variables Ri (µ) and vi (µ) for i = 1, ..., n.
39This distinction may arise, for example, from a system where elected officials choose trade policy but career
bureaucrats make tariff revenue and import license allocations. The presence of political contributions allows us to
model policy choice using the popular GH framework. However, as described below, the result does not depend on
this distinction.
40The organized sectors could be both A and F or just one of these sectors.
41We treat the actions of firms in subsequent periods s ≥ 1, and hence their payoffs in such periods, as given by
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game analyzed in the previous section. More formally, period 0 firm strategies
are merely represented by the sector contribution schedules Rj (µ).
42Specifically, perhaps Γs = 1 for s = 1, 2, 3, 4 but Γs = 0 for s ≥ 5.
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is then obtained from:
max
µ∈{t∗,M∗}
∑
j∈O Vj (µ) + aW (µ)
s.t.
t∗ = arg max
t∈[0,tpro]
∑
j∈O Vj (t) + aW (t)
M∗ = arg max
M¯∈[0,MFT ]
∑
j∈O Vj
(
M¯
)
+ aW
(
M¯
)
.
(25)
In understanding our main result on the government's policy choice, it is useful to define tˆ and
Mˆ as, respectively, the tariff and quota solutions to the constraints in (25) when rent-seeking is
exogenously imposed as zero in periods s ≥ 1. In turn, let µˆ ∈
{
tˆ, Mˆ
}
be the policy that maximizes
the government's payoff in this situation. Importantly, note that µ∗ 6= µˆ is possible even if the
policy µ∗ sustains cooperation. That is, the policy that maximizes the government's payoff when
no rent-seeking is exogenously imposed, i.e., µˆ, may induce rent-seeking when firms endogenously
engage in rent-seeking. The government may thus find it attractive to implement some policy µ∗ 6= µˆ
where firms endogenously refrain from rent-seeking under µ∗. For example, a policy µˆ ∈
{
tˆ, Mˆ
}
may create high enough rents that firms cannot resist deviating from cooperation, but moving the
policy away from µˆ may allow cooperation by mediating rents and, thus, deviation incentives.
Before presenting our result on the government's policy choice, we make the following assump-
tion, where δ =min
{
δ¯ (µ) |µ ∈ [0,MFT ] or µ ∈ [0, tpro]} is defined as the minimum value of δ that
could sustain cooperation under some policy.
Assumption 1. (i) δ¯ (µ) is continuous in µ for each policy regime.
(ii) G (µ) is strictly concave in µ for each policy regime when, exogenously, Rs = 0 for all periods
s ≥ 1.
(iii) If µ∗ = M¯ and δ > δ¯
(
M¯
)
then G
(
M¯
)
> G (µ) for all µ such that δ ∈ (δ, δ¯ (µ)).
Part (i) of Assumption 1 simply depends on the continuity of individual payoff functions underlying
δ¯ (µ) (see (18)). Part (ii) does two things.43 First, it ensures that tˆ and Mˆ , described above, are
unique. Second, and more importantly, it allows comparison of government payoffs across different
policies in the absence of rent-seeking because the government prefers smaller deviations from tˆ
and Mˆ . Finally, part (iii) allows us to make a particular comparison of government payoffs across
43Using a similar GH-type setup to that in the current section, Maggi and Rodrguez-Clare (2000) also assume
strict concavity of the government payoff function.
23
situations where cooperation is and is not sustained. Specifically, if the policy that solves (25) is
a quota that sustains cooperation, then the government cannot obtain a higher payoff via a policy
that does not sustain cooperation. Part (iii) is thus a fairly weak uniqueness requirement.
We now present our main result on government policy, recalling that µ∗ is a policy that maximizes
the government's payoff.
Proposition 2. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 1 hold. Then, a quota maximizes the gov-
ernment's payoff whenever cooperation is possible under µ∗. While tˆ and Mˆ both maximize the
government's payoff when δ ≥ δ¯ (tˆ), a quota uniquely maximizes the government's payoff when (i)
δ ∈
[
δ¯
(
Mˆ
)
, δ¯
(
tˆ
))
, in which case µ∗ = Mˆ , or (ii) δ < δ¯
(
Mˆ
)
and cooperation prevails under µ∗,
in which case µ∗ = M¯ for some M¯ 6= Mˆ .
Proposition 2 essentially follows from the results that (i) tariffs and quotas are equivalent under
cooperation and (ii) cooperation is easier to sustain under quotas than tariffs. First, suppose µ∗
sustains cooperation and firms actually sustain cooperation when allowed to rent-seek under the
policies tˆ and Mˆ . Then, tˆ and Mˆ must both maximize the government's payoff: not only do firms
endogenously refrain from rent-seeking under these policies but, by definition, they maximize the
government's payoff in the absence of rent-seeking. Given that cooperation is easier to sustain under
quotas than tariffs, this case corresponds to δ ≥ δ¯ (tˆ). Second, once δ ∈ [δ¯ (Mˆ) , δ¯ (tˆ)), the quota
Mˆ still sustains cooperation but the tariff tˆ no longer does. Thus, the quota Mˆ is now the unique
policy that maximizes the government's payoff.
Finally, δ < δ¯
(
Mˆ
)
implies that firms cannot sustain cooperation under either tˆ or Mˆ . Thus,
such policies cannot maximize the government's payoff if firms endogenously refrain from rent-
seeking under µ∗. Indeed, moving the policy away from tˆ or Mˆ may generate cooperation (perhaps
by lowering rents and reducing deviation incentives). Moreover, a quota M¯ 6= Mˆ is the unique
policy that maximizes the government's payoff if µ∗ generates cooperation because (i) sustaining
cooperation is easier under quotas than tariffs and (ii) Assumption 1 implies the government can
get closer to Mˆ with a quota that sustains cooperation than it can get to tˆ with a tariff that sustains
cooperation.
We use the GH framework to fix ideas given its widespread usage when modeling endogenous
policy choice. However, Proposition 1 generalizes beyond this framework. Given the equivalence
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of tariffs and quotas under cooperation and the result that sustaining cooperation is easier under
quotas than tariffs, Proposition 2 only depends on Assumption 1 and not the particular nature
of lobbying interaction between firms and the government in period 0. Moreover, the crucial part
of Assumption 2 is part (ii): part (iii) is a fairly weak uniqueness requirement and part (i) is
independent of period 0 interaction between firms and the government. Thus, regardless of the
exact nature of lobbying in period 0, Proposition 1 holds if lobbying preserves strict concavity of
the government's payoff in the (exogenous) absence of rent-seeking during subsequent periods, a
standard assumption in prior literature (e.g., Maggi and Rodrguez-Clare 2000).44
Thus, the distinction made above between lobbying (as a transfer of resources) and rent-seeking
(as a use of labor) is useful for adopting the familiar GH framework but not necessary for our result.
Even if the period 0 interaction takes the form of rent-seeking, Proposition 1 continues to hold
if the government's payoff function (in the exogenous absence of rent-seeking) is strictly concave
with respect to trade policy. For example, instead of a direct transfer of resources, firms may hire
labor in period 0 to provide the government with electoral services similar to those provided by
Political Action Committees (PACs) in the United States. Such services include the coordination
and pooling of donor funds by traditional PACs and the independent expenditures made by Super
PACs that have become especially important following the 2010 ruling in Speechnow.org v. Federal
Election Commission.45 These electoral services are valuable to the government but are rewarded
with restrictive trade policies that generate welfare losses. This creates a trade-off whereby the
government's payoff can be concave with respect to trade policy so that Assumption 1 still holds.
44This concavity arises because the government faces a trade-off between the benefits (e.g., contributions) and
the welfare costs of lobbying created by non-free trade policies. The government's payoff is concave because small
deviations from free trade impose negligible welfare costs but these costs become overwhelming with large deviations
from free trade.
45The Center for Responsive Politics describes independent expenditures as expenditures used to buy ads,
send mail or otherwise advocate for the election or defeat of specific candidates (https://www.opensecrets.org/
resources/learn/glossary.php). The Speechnow.org v. Federal Election Commission ruling allows organizations
that only engage in independent expenditures to essentially raise unlimited funds for such purposes.
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5 Extensions
5.1 Distinct owner of distribution capital
So far, we have assumed a uniform allocation of distribution sector capital across specific factor
owners in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. We now consider the case where distribution
sector capital is owned by a third group. The case where distribution capital is owned by a subset
of A and F specific factor owners is analogous.
While tariff revenues remain subject to rent-seeking by all specific factor owners, quota allo-
cations are subject only to rent-seeking by specific factor owners of the distribution sector. Thus,
the relevant δ¯rj determining sustainability of cooperation under tariffs is max
{
δ¯tD, δ¯
t
F , δ¯
t
A
}
but un-
der quotas it is δ¯qD. Nevertheless, the cooperation constraint is tighter under tariffs than quotas if
δ¯qD < δ¯
t
D.
When a distinct group owns the distribution capital, the size of the group engaging in rent-
seeking is higher under the tariff than the quota. A group size effect is the key implication in
this case. The group size effect influences both the deviation incentive and the punishment threat.
Underlying Proposition 1 is the idea that an increasing marginal cost of distribution makes deviation
less attractive under the quota relative to the tariff regime. The group size effect reinforces this
result: since quota rents are now shared among a smaller group under cooperation, there is a
smaller gain from deviating and gaining all import licenses. This further strengthens the result of
Proposition 1.
However, the effect of group size on the punishment threat must also be considered. A smaller
group engaging in quota rent-seeking increases firm-level rent-seeking labor but lowers aggregate
rent-seeking labor (see (9)). All else equal, the former lowers a firm's rent-seeking payoff by in-
creasing rent-seeking expenditures. But the latter mitigates the upward pressure on w and the
downward pressure on pD caused by rent-seeking through general equilibrium effects, increasing a
firm's excess rent (see (5)) and reducing rent-seeking expenditures. Thus, when general equilibrium
wage and price effects are minimal, the group size effect strengthens Proposition 1. However, it is
possible that Proposition 1 would be overturned if the general equilibrium effects are strong enough
to weaken the punishment threat so far that it outweighs the smaller gain from deviation under
quotas.
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5.2 Non-discretionary tariff revenue
While quota rents accrue directly to distribution firms through market mechanisms, the government
allocates tariff revenue across various uses. Moreover, some portion of this revenue will likely be
non-discretionary, which reduces the amount of tariff revenue whose allocation can be influenced
by rent-seeking.46 Earlier sections abstracted from this consideration because, by construction, this
destroys the equivalence of tariffs and quotas even under cooperation.
Naturally, a non-discretionary tariff revenue component reduces the incentive to deviate from
cooperation under tariffs because the tariff revenue captured by rent-seeking falls. Thus, all else
equal, the ability to sustain cooperation rises under tariffs. Indeed, despite costly import distri-
bution, the deviation incentive could now be weaker under the tariff regime rather than the quota
regime if the share of non-discretionary government revenue is sufficiently large.
However, non-discretionary tariff revenue also weakens the punishment threat, which in turn
reduces the ability to sustain cooperation under tariffs. First, non-discretionary tariff revenue
reduces firm-level tariff revenue receipts and directly weakens the punishment threat.47 General
equilibrium consequences reinforce this effect. Less labor is hired for rent-seeking because the reward
for rent-seeking is lower. This in turn reduces upward wage pressure and increases agriculture
and manufactured output. Thus, when some tariff revenue is non-discretionary, the net impact
on the relative ability to sustain cooperation under tariffs and quotas depends on whether the
weaker deviation incentive is outweighed by the weaker punishment threat under the tariff regime.
Proposition 1 would be overturned if the tariff deviation incentive weakens sufficiently relative to
the tariff punishment threat.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the long-standing debate over the equivalence of tariffs and quotas in
environments where agents can engage in both rent- and revenue-seeking. Our paper is novel in
considering repeated interaction, which allows individual firms to sustain cooperation and thereby
46On the other hand, government revenue is derived from sources other than tariff revenue. Thus, the revenue
whose allocation can be influenced by lobbying may exceed tariff revenue. This case is the opposite of the non-
discretionary revenue case.
47While the revenue allocation is smaller under both cooperation and rent-seeking, the effect is proportionately
greater under cooperation.
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eliminate wasteful rent- and revenue-seeking expenditures through implicit punishments.
In the flavor of prior literature, tariffs and quotas are equivalent if cooperation obtains under
both policies. However, non-equivalence emerges because the conditions under which cooperation
is sustained differ across policies. In particular, when a simple sufficient condition is satisfied,
cooperation is easier to sustain under quotas than tariffs. In this sense, quotas are welfare enhancing
relative to tariffs because cooperation eliminates wasteful rent-seeking. This main result arises
because of a costly distribution effect. Unlike consumption of additional tariff revenue, benefiting
from additional import licenses requires that specific factor owners in the distribution sector hire
additional labor, which makes deviation less attractive under the quota regime relative to the tariff
regime.
We also consider the government's policy choice in light of this non-equivalence result. Because
the constraint on cooperation has more slack under quotas, a quota is chosen if the policy that
maximizes the government's payoff produces cooperation in equilibrium. This contrasts with the
general preference for tariffs over quotas in the current institutional environment and, thus, may
help explain the persistent use of quotas in practice.
Our analysis suggests some additional questions of interest. First, we assume that the specific
factors are uniformly distributed across specific factor owners. Equilibrium outcomes and constraints
on cooperation may differ when the specific factor distribution is non-uniform, and a skewed distri-
bution of capital may change the possibility of cooperation and thus the incidence of rent-seeking.
Second, we maintain assumptions about the relative labor intensity of the three industries. It would
be interesting to consider how these assumptions relate to a country's factor endowments and its
trade pattern.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Equation (9). The first-order condition with respect to LR is
R− LR
(R)2
pDM¯ − w
1 + ∂LD
(
LR
R M¯
)
∂LR
 = 0. (26)
Moreover, letting κ = LRR M¯ represent the rent-seeking firm's quota allocation,
∂LD
(
LR
R M¯
)
∂LR
=
∂LD (·)
∂κ
× ∂κ
∂LR
=
∂LD (·)
∂QD
× ∂κ
∂LR
=
1
dL (LD)
× R− LR
(R)2
M¯.
Substituting into (26), imposing a symmetric solution for all firms, using the definition of τD in (5)
and rearranging yields:
R− LR
(R)2
M¯
(
pD − w
dL (LD)
)
− w = 0
n− 1
n2
1
LR
M¯τD − w = 0
LR =
n− 1
n2
1
w
V. (27)
Proof of Equation (22). First, setting pq,dF = p
q,c
F and w
q,d = wq,c, note that:
(
Πt,dD + pi
t,d
D
)
−
(
Πq,dD + pi
q,d
D
)
=
[
pt,dD Q
t,d
D − wt,dLt,dD (Qt,dD ) + tM¯
]
−
[
pq,dD Q
q,d
D − wq,dLq,dD (Qq,dD )
]
=
[
pt,dD
M¯
n
− wt,dLD
(
M¯
n
)
+ tM¯
]
−
[
pq,dD M¯ − wq,dLD
(
M¯
)]
=
[
ρq,cD
M¯
n
− wq,cLD
(
M¯
n
)
+ tM¯
]
− [pq,cD M¯ − wq,cLD (M¯)]
=
[
wq,cLD(M¯)− wq,cLD
(
M¯
n
)]
−
[
pq,cD M¯ − ρq,cD
M¯
n
− tM¯
]
. (28)
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Second, note that:
pq,cD M¯ =
(
ρq,cD + τ
q,c
)
M¯
=
(
ρq,cD + t
)
M¯. (29)
Thus, substituting (29) into (28) yields:
(
Πt,dD + pi
t,d
D
)
−
(
Πq,dD + pi
q,d
D
)
=
[
wq,cLD(M¯)− wq,cLD
(
M¯
n
)]
− ρq,cD
[
M¯ − M¯
n
]
=
∫ M¯
0
wq,c
dL (LD (QD))
dQD −
∫ M¯
n
0
wq,c
dL (LD (QD))
dQD − ρq,cD
[
M¯ − M¯
n
]
=
∫ M¯
M¯
n
wq,c
dL (LD (QD))
dQD − ρq,cD
[
M¯ − M¯
n
]
.
Proof that wages rise with rent-seeking. The proof is by contradiction. First, consider
a binding quota so that Qq,ND =
M¯
n and L
q,N
D = L
q,c
D . Suppose w
q,c > wq,N . Then, Lq,NA > L
q,c
A
and, given Lq,NR > 0, full employment and a symmetric equilibrium implies L
q,N
F < L
q,c
F . In turn,
fL(L
q,N
F ) > fL(L
q,c
F ) which, via the first-order condition (3), implies p
q,N
F < p
q,c
F . However, since
X = M = M¯ = D and, given symmetry, F falls and A rises (due to changes in sectoral labor), then
F+D
A−X =
CF
CA
falls. Homothetic preferences then imply pq,NF > p
q,c
F which is a contradiction.
Second, consider a tariff. Suppose wt,c > wt,N . Then Lt,NA > L
t,c
A . Since L
t,N
R > 0, full
employment and symmetry imply either Lt,NF < L
t,c
F , L
t,N
D < L
t,c
D , or both.
Let Lt,NF < L
t,c
F and L
t,N
D < L
t,c
D . Then,
F+D
A−X falls upon rent-seeking and, via homothetic
preferences, pt,NF > p
t,c
F . But, given symmetry, the first-order condition (3) implies p
t,N
F < p
t,c
F given
fL
(
Lt,NF
)
> fL
(
Lt,cF
)
and wt,N < wt,c. This is a contradiction.
Now, let Lt,NF < L
t,c
F and L
t,N
D > L
t,c
D . Hereafter, ∆x ≡ xt,N − xt,c for any variable x; e.g.,
∆pD ≡ pt,ND − pt,cD and ∆fL ≡ fL
(
Lt,NF
)
− fL
(
Lt,cF
)
. Then ∆fL > 0 and ∆dL < 0. In turn, given
wt,c > wt,N , then first-order condition (3) requires ∆pF < 0. Moreover, given pF = 1 + pD + t, the
first-order conditions (3)-(4) require fL (LF ) < dL (LD) and ∆w = ∆ (pF fL (·)) ≡ pt,NF fL
(
Lt,NF
)
−
pt,cF fL
(
Lt,cF
)
= ∆ (pDdL (·)) ≡ pt,ND dL
(
Lt,ND
)
−pt,cD dL
(
Lt,cD
)
. But, ∆ (pF fL (·)) = fL
(
Lt,c,F
)
∆pD+(
1 + pt,ND + t
)
∆fL > dL
(
Lt,cD
)
∆pD + p
t,N
D ∆dL = ∆ (pDdL (·)) which is a contradiction.
Finally, let Lt,ND < L
t,c
D and L
t,N
F > L
t,c
F . Four observations establish the contradiction. First,
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∆LD < 0 and ∆LF > 0. Second, given ∆LA > 0 and L
t,N
R > 0, full employment requires
∆LD < −∆LF < 0. Third, wt,N < wt,c implies ∆LA > 0, ∆A > 0 and, using the first-order
condition (4), ∆pD < 0 and hence ∆pF < 0. Fourth, the first-order conditions (3)-(4) require
fL
(
Lt,cF
)
< dL
(
Lt,cD
)
which, in turn, implies fL (LF ) < dL (LD) for any LF > L
t,c
F and LD < L
t,c
D .
Letting dLF = −dLD > 0, the first and fourth observations imply dQF
(
Lt,cF
)
= fL(L
t,c
F )× dLF <
−
(
dL(L
t,c
D )× dLD
)
= −dQD. Since the fourth observation implies the previous expression holds
for any marginal changes dLF = −dLD > 0 then the second observation (∆LD < −∆LF < 0)
implies ∆QF < −∆QD < 0. However, we now have a contradiction because, via symmetry and
∆X = ∆M = ∆D, ∆
(
F+D
A
)
< 0 which, via homothetic preferences, requires ∆pF > 0 and
contradicts the third observation.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is by contradiction. We omit the N superscript for brevity
since all variables refer to the Nash rent-seeking equilibrium. Note that M t = M¯ and symmetry
imply LtD = L
q
D and Q
t
D = Q
q
D. We first show L
t
A = L
q
A by ruling out L
t
A < L
q
A and L
t
A > L
q
A.
Suppose LtA < L
q
A (and, hence, Q
t
A < Q
q
A). Two implications follow. First, using (2), w
t > wq.
Second, full employment and symmetry (see (13)) require either (i) LtF > L
q
F or (ii) L
t
F ≤ LqF and
LtR > L
q
R.
Case (i): LtF > L
q
F implies Q
t
F > Q
q
F . Thus, given Q
t
D = Q
q
D and Q
t
A < Q
q
A , we have(
F+D
A−X
)t
>
(
F+D
A−X
)q
. Via homothetic preferences, this implies ptF < p
q
F . Further, L
t
F > L
q
F implies
fL(L
t
F ) < fL(L
q
F ). But, (3) then implies fL(L
t
F ) × ptF = wt < wq = fL(LqF ) × pqF , a contradiction
to wt > wq.
Case (ii): First, let LtF = L
q
F . Then, given D = M = X,
(
F+D
A−X
)t
>
(
F+D
A−X
)q
and, via
homothetic preferences, ptF < p
q
F . But, combined with fL(L
t
D) = fL(L
q
D), we now have the con-
tradiction that wt < wq. Second, let LtF < L
q
F and, given symmetry, F
t < F q. Given LtR > L
q
R
and wt > wq, (8) and (9) imply revenues exceed rents: t ×M = t × M¯ > τ × M¯ . In turn, t > τ .
Further, given wt > wq and LtD = L
q
D, we have p
t
D =
wt
dL(L
t
D)
> w
q
dL(L
t
D)
= w
q
dL(L
q
D)
≡ ρ and thus
ptF = 1+t+p
t
D > 1+τ+ρ ≡ 1+pqD = pqF . Homothetic preferences then imply
(
F+D
A−X
)t
<
(
F+D
A−X
)q
.
However, our technological assumptions in Section 2.4 imply
(
F+D
A
)t
>
(
F+D
A
)q
when LtR > L
q
R
and M t = M¯ . Further, F t < F q and Dt = Dq imply
(
F+D
D
)t
<
(
F+D
D
)q
. Thus, given X = D,
manipulating
(
F+D
A−X
)t
>
(
F+D
A−X
)q
reveals the contradiction that F q < F t.
Now suppose LtA > L
q
A (and, thus, Q
t
A < Q
q
A). Two implications follow. First, using (2),
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wt < wq. Second, full employment (see (13)) requires either (i) LtF < L
q
F or (ii) L
t
F ≥ LqF and
LtR < L
q
R. Similar logic to cases (i) and (ii) above yields similar contradictions. Thus, we have
established LtA = L
q
A and, in turn, w
t = wq and QtA = Q
q
A.
The second step of the proof is to show LtF = L
q
F and L
t
R = L
q
R. Given L
t
D = L
q
D and L
t
A = L
q
A
and the full employment condition, this only requires ruling out (i) LtF < L
q
F and (ii) L
t
F > L
q
F .
But, the same logic that ruled out these cases above applies again. Therefore, M = M¯ implies
Ltj = L
q
j for j = D,A, F,R.
Finally, we establish vtj = v
q
j . Since we have established L
t
j = L
q
j for j = D,A, F,R then Q
t
j = Q
q
j
for j = D,A, F and wt = wq. Thus, ptF = p
q
F given homothetic preferences and X = M = D.
Moreover, we have ρ ≡ wq
dL(L
q
D)
= w
t
dL(L
t
D)
= ptD which, via (1) and (5) together with p
t
F = p
q
F , implies
τ = t. Thus, Πtj = Π
q
j and pi
t
j = pi
q
j for j = A,D,F which implies v
t
j = v
q
j for j = A,F .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let µˆ ∈
{
Mˆ, tˆ
}
and µ∗ ∈ {M∗, t∗} and suppose µ∗ sustains
cooperation, i.e., δ > δ¯(µ∗). There are two cases to consider: µˆ = µ∗ and µˆ 6= µ∗.
First, let µˆ = µ∗. Suppose µˆ = tˆ ≡ tˆ (M¯) where tˆ (M¯) is the quota equivalent tariff of M¯ . Then,
δ > δ¯(tˆ
(
M¯
)
). Moreover, via Proposition 1, M¯ also sustains cooperation because δ > δ¯(tˆ
(
M¯
)
) >
δ¯(M¯). By equivalence, G
(
tˆ
(
M¯
))
= G
(
M¯, ·) = G(Mˆ, ·) and hence tˆ (M¯) = µˆ = µ∗ implies
Mˆ = µˆ = µ∗.
Now suppose µˆ = Mˆ . Then, δ > δ¯(Mˆ). By Proposition 1, t
(
Mˆ
)
sustains cooperation if and
only if δ > δ¯
(
t
(
Mˆ
))
where δ¯
(
t
(
Mˆ
))
> δ¯(Mˆ). If δ > δ¯
(
t
(
Mˆ
))
then, by similar logic to the
previous case, t
(
Mˆ
)
= µˆ = µ∗. But, parts (ii) and (iii) of Assumption 1 imply Mˆ = µˆ = µ∗ is
unique if δ < δ¯
(
t
(
Mˆ
))
.
Second, let µˆ 6= µ∗ but δ > δ¯ (µ∗) so that cooperation prevails under µ∗ even though Proposition
1 implies δ < δ¯(Mˆ) < δ¯(tˆ). We want to show µ∗ 6= t for any t. Take any tariff t˜ yielding cooperation
(i.e., δ > δ¯
(
t˜
)
). Then, Proposition 1 implies δ > δ¯
(
t˜
)
> δ¯(M(t˜)) whereM
(
t˜
)
is the tariff equivalent
quota of t˜. Assumption 1(i)-(ii) implies there exists M¯ such that
∣∣∣Mˆ − M¯ ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣Mˆ −M(t˜)∣∣∣ and
δ¯
(
M¯
)
< δ < δ¯
(
t(M¯)
)
. Letting Gˆ (µ) denote the government's payoff under policy µ when LR,s = 0
is exogenously imposed for all periods s ≥ 1, G (M¯, ·) = Gˆ (M¯, ·) = Gˆ (t (M¯) , ·) > Gˆ (M (t˜) , ·) =
Gˆ
(
t˜, ·) = G (t˜, ·). Thus, G (M¯, ·) > G (t˜, ·). Hence, µ∗ 6= t for any t such that δ > δ¯(t) because
there exists M¯ such that δ > δ¯(M¯) and G
(
M¯, ·) > G (t, ·). Finally, Assumption 1(iii) implies
µ∗ 6= µ for any µ such that δ < δ¯(µ).
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